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 Regulation as country specific (dis-)advantage: Smoking bans and the location of FDI 
in the tobacco industry 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to examine the relationship between smoking bans and the propensity 
of tobacco firms to engage in FDI. Utilising international business theory based on the 
FSA/CSA matrix, we show that, contrary to what one may expect, that  smoking bans at 
home are an important institutional intervention, reducing the propensity for firms to engage 
in FDI, even to countries without a ban themselves.  
Keywords: Tobacco, FDI, Institutions, Smoking Ban 
1. Introduction 
The importance of institutions in both the context of international business, and indeed 
in explaining variations in firm performance has been in the spotlight for some time. Often 
this is discussed within the context of emerging markets, and how improving institutions 
leads to firm performance (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009); building on the broader seminal 
analysis of institutional quality by Crawford and Ostrom (1995). This literature essentially 
argues that institutional quality is a crucial driver of firm performance, and in turn 
international location decisions (Driffield et al 2014). Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti (2014) 
extend this by arguing that institutional quality at home, within the context of emerging 
market multinationals, is an important driver of internationalisation, as firms seek to “escape” 
poor institutional quality. However, such analysis tends to rely on cross country assessments 
of institutional quality in order to construct an index, which can then be used to explain the 
location decision. We seek, through a unique lens, to extend this literature in examining the 
role of a specific institutional intervention - the imposition of a smoking ban, and the impact 
that they have on the internationalisation of tobacco firms. Our point of interest is foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the tobacco sector, which is to say, at the firm level, the 
acquisition or creation of income generating assets by a firm resident in one country, but 
investing abroad.1 
 
In itself, the continuing regulation and government intervention in this sector has 
received widespread comment over a number of years, and from a variety of perspectives. 
                                                          
1 See for example http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193734.pdf 
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The exposure of second-hand smoke on public health has become a major policy concern for 
health officials across the world. The World Health Organisation estimates that over six 
million people a year die from smoking related illnesses, and emphasise the role that 
government interventions can play in countering this2. Consequently, governments have 
introduced rules, regulations and laws banning smoking in various public places. Not without 
controversy, further impetus was given in 2003 when the World Health Organization’s 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) compelled signatories to further enact 
comprehensive smoking bans. By 2012, 176 countries had become party to the convention.  
Typically, this literature has relied on cross country estimates of institutions or other 
cultural or geographic phenomena. As Teegan (2003) points out, most institutions are 
national, and provide the setting by which private agents interact. Our approach therefore 
seeks to extend our understanding of the importance of regulation within the tobacco 
industry. We use an identifier of variation in national governance structures: the existence, or 
otherwise, of a smoking ban, and employ this, alongside the imposition of excise duty, in the 
context of a set of firms in a relatively homogeneous industry. Focussing on a specific sector, 
we seek to develop the literature on institutions developed from North (1990) and applied to 
firm internationalisation (Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, and Lange, 2014).  
The tobacco industry and its location decisions offer a particularly interesting subject 
in this context. The industry is subject to a wide range and ever tightening set of regulatory 
and policy controls, from trade restrictions and anti-smuggling interventions that also hinder 
intra-firm trade (Gillespie, 2003), advertising bans (Saffer & Chaloupka, 2000), sales 
restrictions (Stead & Lancaster, 2008), and more recently smoking bans in public places 
(Longo, Johnson, Kruse, Brownson, & Hewett, 2001). Indeed there has been an assertion for 
some time that tobacco firms are responding to smoking bans, and indeed a more general 
decline in sales in their traditional developed country markets by seeking new markets in the 
developing world (Gilmore & McKee, 2004). Equally, informal institutions, voluntary codes 
and the ethics of the industry have always taken second place to economic considerations, 
including tax revenues, and it is only recently that formal institutions have had a significant 
impact in the form of the banning of smoking in public places.3 Thus our analysis builds on 
Hillier, Pindado, de Queiroz, and de la Torre (2011) and sees smoking bans as the key 
                                                          
2 http://www.who.int/gho/tobacco/en/ 
3 For an example of recent deliberations on this, see details of the World Health Organization meeting in 
October 2014, available at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/cop6-tobacco-control/en/. 
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institution in this sector which varies across countries, both in terms of legislation and 
enforcement. Further, we compare the imposition of a smoking ban with the imposition of 
excise duties on tobacco, in exploring the impact of the two main interventions designed to 
deter smoking. Within the context of international business, the industry offers an additional 
advantage in terms of isolating the effects of intervention on internationalisation. The 
growing of tobacco typically occurs outside of the large firms, who have no need to engage in 
resource seeking FDI4. Traditionally, international production has been strongly linked to 
local sales and local branding, with very low levels of what might be termed efficiency 
seeking FDI. As such, FDI in this sector is of a market seeking nature. 
Where IB theory has been applied to problems such as this, the analysis has 
essentially applied Dunning’s eclectic paradigm to the issue of how best to lever firm specific 
advantages, such as a brand or a particular technology, into new markets. It is likely that one 
would simply observe exporting behaviour, followed by market seeking FDI once potential 
foreign sales reach a given scale. However, we argue that government intervention in this 
industry may be so pervasive, and (for very good reasons) so significant to the operations of 
the firm, that the lack of institutional intervention (i.e. the lack of a smoking ban) in the 
firm’s home market equates to a source of country-specific advantage (CSA) over firms from 
other countries with high degrees of regulation or intervention. We therefore seek to link our 
firm level measures of firm performance, that are hypothesised to be positively related to 
internationalisation, to interventions designed to inhibit firm performance. 
In order to investigate this phenomenon, we utilise a database that allows us to not 
only identify all instances of FDI in this sector for the period 1997–2009, but also to link 
directly parent and subsidiary information at the firm level. The major insight of this paper is 
that smoking bans, rather than prompting the relocation of firms, act as an institutional 
constraint on internationalisation. It would appear therefore that FDI in this sector appears to 
be more prevalent from countries without smoking bans. Thus smoking bans at home can be 
seen as a major source of country specific dis-advantage (CSA) that impacts upon firm 
strategy.  
                                                          
4 See for example http://www.bat.com/farmers who state that they purchase from over one hundred thousand 
contracted farmers, or http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/economics/econ_facts/ who 
outline the structure of the industry in the US.  
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Whilst we argue therefore that regulation, or in this case the lack of it, can be a source 
of CSA for firms in this sector, we extend our analysis further. We go on to argue that the 
host and home dimensions interact with each other. Contrary to the common conception, 
which has argued that firms go abroad as the demand for tobacco at home declines, our 
results suggest that tobacco firms are more likely to invest in countries without a smoking 
ban if there is a lack of a smoking ban at home. This, we attribute to the impact that a 
smoking ban has on the resources available to facilitate internationalization. We subsequently 
explore this in terms of the interactions between firm specific and country specific 
advantages, both at home and abroad, that drive internationalisation.  Following this we go on 
to discuss the policy aspects of our findings within the dominant IB frameworks. Given the 
fact that a majority of countries without tobacco controls tend to have low levels of human 
development (see Table A1), this has severe ramifications for health-care policy in the 
poorest parts of the world. It is notable for example that India recently banned FDI in the 
tobacco sector, and there is pressure for governments in developing countries to provide 
better education on the health risks associated with smoking, and more regulation on 
advertising. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework 
on which our study is based, linking the theoretical basis of studies on FDI with our other 
theoretical lens of institutional theory. Section 3 develops the empirical model, and presents 
the data. The remaining sections are devoted to a discussion of our results and the conclusion 
which discusses policy.  
2. Theoretical framework 
The stylised literature on FDI by multinational enterprises (MNEs) has at its basis the 
ownership–location–internalisation (OLI) framework of Dunning (1979, 1988). The basic 
proposition of the OLI framework continues to be valid in the sense that MNEs expand into 
other countries and continents to take advantage of local resources and by leveraging their 
own unique capabilities (Luo & Tung, 2007). Rugman (1981, 1985, 2005) divides the three 
components of the Eclectic Paradigm into firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and country 
specific advantages (CSAs). Our approach is to analyse the changes in international 
production in the tobacco industry, using the FSA/CSA framework of Rugman (1981), which 
in Rugman (2010) he juxtaposes with the OLI approach of Dunning (1979) in terms of 
exploring FDI in the CSA/FSA setting from the perspective of the host country as well as the 
source country.    
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Rugman (2010) builds on the overlap between FSA and the desire of the firm to 
internalise its internationalisation strategy, based on transaction cost considerations by 
considering what he terms “Hymer-type” advantages (Hymer 1960), or in this context 
Dunnings ownership advantage. These are the FSAs that exist at the firm level, and in our 
setting facilitate internationalisation, through brands, marketing expertise and potentially 
product quality. This firm level analysis then has to be mapped onto the CSA/FSA matrix, 
with respect to the home as well as host country (Rugman 2010)5.   
Of perhaps more relevance to the issue at hand here is the interaction between 
location advantage and Rugman’s use of the term CSA. Extending Rugman’s (2010) analysis 
to the home country, we argue that the imposition of a smoking ban is a key deterrent to FDI 
in this sector from the perspective of the host country, but equally acts to reduce the 
likelihood of FDI from the perspective of the home country. This therefore builds on the 
related analysis of Hennart (2009), who extends the traditional internalization analysis to the 
interaction between not only the firm’s FSAs, but also the complementary resources available 
to the firm from both its home and potential host location. Within the context of the tobacco 
industry, we see intervention at home, and abroad, as crucial resources for the firm, 
interacted, as Hennart (2009) suggests, with their own FSAs. 
2.1. Regulation and country-specific disadvantage 
The analysis that we apply here is the standard approach to country specific and firm 
specific advantage (Rugman 1981). Country specific advantage is typically analysed in terms 
of market efficiency, institutions, quality of goods and capital markets, and resources 
including natural resources and labour. In this context institutional quality is seen as a key 
country specific advantage, facilitating transactions and reducing risk (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Dau, 2009). Our key institution here is the attitude of government and society to tobacco, 
expressed through both formal and informal institutions, and the extent to which this can 
impact on location choice. Abdi and Aulakh (2012) summarise the problem elegantly, 
arguing that firms interact with their institutional environment through norms that are 
established on the basis of how well firms understand their environment (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
                                                          
5 This is a similar approach to that which explores the distinction between emerging market multinationals and 
MNEs from the west, with FDI by the latter explained by home country CSAs rather than FSAs in the form  of 
ownership advantages, see for example Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti  (2014) 
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We argue that in this setting, the lack of a smoking ban in a firm’s home country 
provides what may be termed a country specific advantage (CSA) for tobacco firms, to 
facilitate and finance international expansion through FDI. Because the imposition of a 
smoking ban runs counter to the interests of the tobacco industry, it acts as an important 
institutional constraint on firm behaviour. It can therefore be seen as a source of home 
country-specific disadvantage. This regulation or intervention impinges to such an extent on 
the market seeking motivation for firms to internationalise, perhaps through a combination of 
reduced resources to fund FDI, but perhaps also the fear of adverse criticism (Neville et. al, 
2005), that the propensity to internationalise is reduced. Here, one can view the institutional 
intervention (the ban) as a proxy for a more general anti-smoking stance among at least a 
significant proportion of the population (if smoking bans were too politically unpopular they 
would not be introduced). Thus, as well as impacting directly on the consumption of the 
product, smoking bans can also be seen as indicators of more long term changes in demand. 
Additionally, one can also consider the imposition of excise duty in a similar vein. 
Excise taxes have historically been the most common weapon used by governments in 
developed economies to combat cigarette consumption. Standard Ramsey rule tax analysis 
suggests that goods with a low elasticity of demand should be taxed due to the minimal 
impact upon production and consumption. Tobacco is an addictive product and the user 
response to a price change is likely to be minimal.  In this case, although governments may 
wish to reduce tobacco consumption to alleviate health pressures, they also get the added 
benefit of raising revenue. In contrast, a tobacco ban only impacts on the former in direct 
contrast to the latter. This suggests that although tobacco bans and the use of excise taxes 
may be seen in a similar light, the effect of a ban is potentially more direct.  
Additionally, smoking bans can also be viewed as an indicator of public opinion 
regarding the health and ethical issues around smoking. This is important in this context 
because institutions refer not only to legal entities, but to the embeddedness of cultural norms 
and informal institutions. As such, while firms whose home country has implemented 
smoking bans may seek new outlets in countries without bans, they are more likely to face 
criticism at home (Neville et. al., 2005). This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Interventions to reduce smoking at home are a source of country-specific 
disadvantage, leading to a reduction in the propensity of such firms to engage in FDI. 
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 Building upon this hypothesis, our analysis then turns to exploring the location of 
FDI, and the importance of government intervention in the market at home. The evidence 
suggests that developing countries or those with low human development are less likely to 
have smoking bans, and much less likely to enforce them than richer countries, presenting an 
opportunity for tobacco firms. The list of potential host countries without smoking bans in 
2009 includes much of Africa, South East Asia and the former Soviet Union (see Table A1 in 
Appendix A). These are mainly developing countries where the health risks associated with 
smoking are less widely known.6 Equally, tobacco markets in these countries are 
characterised by low levels of enforcement on controls, such as the sale of cigarettes to 
minors (Frieden, 2005). Market seeking FDI in this sector may therefore be drawn to such 
locations, and one could employ an argument similar to that concerning environmental 
regulation that developing countries’ governments may be less selective in terms of the type 
of FDI they can attract, welcoming the employment and investment. 
One can refine this argument further by building on the importance of institutions and 
interventions. Drawing on Williamson (2000), we view institutions as a hierarchy ordered 
according to the frequency of change and the corresponding degree of applicability of 
economising behaviour. Both public governance frameworks and private governance 
structures affect decisions of economic actors most directly, including firms’ choices over 
resource allocation, which also result in performance outcomes.  
 We argue that smoking controls represent an important institutional construct that in 
turn is directly targeted at reducing the demand for the product and therefore in turn designed 
to impact on firm performance. This offers a solution to one of the ambiguities identified by 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, (2009), in that the broader measures of institutional quality can 
represent composite effects with opposite signs7. Smoking bans arise through the democratic 
process; they are often in manifestos at elections, or subject to referenda. As such, smoking 
bans are not merely indicative of social norms in a country, but their enforcement is an 
indicator of institutional and regulatory quality. Smoking bans are therefore an indication of 
public opinion regarding the health and ethical issues around smoking. This is important in 
this context because institutions refer not only to legal entities, but to embeddedness of 
                                                          
6 For further discussion on these issues see World Health Organization (2003). 
7 Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, (2009) cite for example improvements in competition policy. On the one hand, they 
may be expected to improve market efficiency and therefore firm performance, through a more efficient 
allocation of resources. At the same time, this is likely to cause a reduction in performance of hitherto dominant 
firms.  
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cultural norms and informal institutions (Wildavsky, 1987). As such, smoking bans, and the 
extent to which they are adhered to, are not merely legal entities, but reflect much wider 
social norms. In turn, embeddedness affects the formal constitutional rules: these reflect 
general criteria according to which the legal order is built, especially determining how the 
given systems score along the scale defined by the rule of law. As such, while firms whose 
home country has implemented smoking bans may seek new outlets in countries without 
bans, they are more likely to face criticism at home, especially if they seek to exploit markets 
in developing countries.  
This suggests that not only will firms who are located in countries without tobacco bans 
have a greater propensity to do FDI – but they are also more likely to be attracted to countries 
that themselves lack tobacco controls. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Firms from countries without smoking bans are more likely to engage in FDI in 
countries without smoking bans.  
2.2. Firm-specific advantages and internationalisation  
Thus far, we have explored institutions as sources of country specific advantage, from 
the perspective of both host and home countries. We now turn our attention to the importance 
of FSAs in explaining this relationship. The key indicators of firm specific advantage in this 
context are a vector of variables, encompassing both the ability of the firm to internationalise, 
in terms of what Rugman refers to as “Hymer advantages”, and the ability to finance such 
internationalisation. Our initial focus therefore is on a firm sales, cash flow, and intangible 
assets. These are therefore collected from the data. In addition, to capture the importance of 
managerial assets Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, (2013), and Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & 
Cannella, (2008) for example consider board size, within applications of the knowledge 
capital model. They argue that, independent of firm size, board size is a proxy for managerial 
capacity, and combined experience. As such it is positively associated with the ability to 
coordinate international activities, and to carry out successful FDI projects.  
The location for activity is most likely to be in developing countries with low human 
development and weak institutions. Because of this, knowledge capital is of increasing 
importance and this resource base can be obtained by a well-stocked board of directors and 
non-executive directors potentially with political connections. Here we borrow from the 
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resource based view of the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) and argue that boards of directors 
constitute key knowledge capital for the firm, and as such increase both the drive for 
internationalisation, and also the capacity to successfully carry it out (Calabro et al., 2013). 
This is a similar argument to that made in the context of the knowledge capital model of the 
firm, that a significant constraint on firm development and internationalisation is human 
capital and management experience at the strategic level of the company, with director level 
resources being a key driver of this. Extending this, from a company corporate social 
responsibility perspective (CSR) a large number of directors are more likely to push the 
firm’s strategy towards the firm’s core economic responsibilities (Carroll, 1979, 1991), rather 
than a focus on its social objectives. Thus this knowledge capital not only adds to the firm 
specific advantage, facilitating FDI, but also reinforces the firm’s economic responsibilities. 
This leads to our final hypothesis: 
H3: FSAs remain key drivers of internationalisation in the tobacco industry, even where 
institutions and regulation dominates in the sector. 
3. Empirical model 
We begin our analysis with a model that analyses the tobacco firm’s FDI decision. 
Building on Driffield et al. (2013), theoretically the probability of a firm entering a location is 
determined by expectations of future profits ( e ). In equation 1, T is the expected life of the 
investment, and r is the discount rate. 
Prob(FDI) = 1 [
e
pt
pT
p
r   0 )11(                                                                                        (1) 
This is clearly unobservable, but this model can be re-written as a function of a vector 
of firm and home country characteristics such that 
( )1 1
0

  rp
T p
t p
e  = ),( jij                                                                                                (2) 
Where ij  is a vector of firm level effects and j  is a vector of home country effects 
(home country-specific disadvantage). In this paper the home country effect is simply 
whether the parent firm’s country of origin has smoking ban legislation. The appropriate 
estimation technique used is a probit model. Probit models are ideal for studying data with an 
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independent variable which is binomially distributed. One can express probit models in terms 
of the event probability. 
)'()()1(
'
βx
x
 


 dttFDIProb                                                                                         (3) 
Where   is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The probit model 
is essentially a linear regression of the Z score of the event probability on the dependent 
variable (FDI). To interpret the coefficient estimates, therefore, researchers generally look at 
the estimated signs of the regression coefficients or calculate the marginal effects.8 Equation 
3 translates into equation 4 a model which seeks to explain variations in the propensity of 
firms to engage in FDI. 
itkitk
j
jitjit egulationTobacco_ReFSAowfreecashflAgeAgeSalesSalesFDI  


3
1
3
2
23
2
210
 (4) 
 Where itFDI by firm i at time t equals 1 if a tobacco company undertakes foreign 
direct investment in time t.9 The model allows us to test our theoretical hypotheses based on 
Rugman’s (1981) FSA/CSA matrix. The variable Tobacco Regulation k=1, 2 is our 
institutional measure and is either: (1) the imposition of a smoking ban (No_Ban_Home); or 
(2) a proxy for the home excise duty rate (Tobacco Tax). The former is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a firm’s home country of origin has no smoking ban legislation, whilst the latter is 
measured as a percentage. We can therefore formally test H1. By observing a positive 
coefficient for 𝜃1 when NO_BAN_HOME is included we can say that smoking bans at home 
act as a country-specific institutional constraint on the firm’s internationalisation strategy. 
Conversely, if we include the tobacco tax instead of the dummy, a negative coefficient for 𝜃2 
suggests that higher excise duties also act as an important institutional constraint. 
As controls, we also include variables that typically operationalise internationalisation 
theory (see Bhaumik et al. 2010). By including Sales and Sales squared we can determine 
whether FDI is driven by a non-linear relationship in firm size, such that the largest firms do 
FDI. In addition, firm age has often been linked to FDI propensity (Driffield et al 2013) 
                                                          
8 For more information on probit models see Liao (1994). 
9 FDI is observed if the tobacco firm has overseas subsidiaries. 
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though here it may also capture the fact that more established firms are more entrenched in 
the tobacco industry, with higher sunk costs and is therefore more likely to seek new markets 
through FDI. Furthermore, we also include free cash flow, following Baker, Foley, and 
Wurgler, (2008). This is defined as the cash flow available to the firm after its commitments 
needed to maintain its existing asset base. 
 In order to test H3, the vector FSA includes a measure of embedded 
knowledge (the ratio of intangible assets to total assets of the firm). This measure is that 
typically employed with firm level financial data (see, for example, Braunerhjelm, 1996, 
Driffield et al 2013) as a measure of technological or marketing based firm specific 
advantage10. Finally, we also include measures of Knowledge Capital in this vector: (1) the 
number of directors as a measure of managerial resources and (2) the concentration of 
ownership (Herfindahl). The inclusion of the number of directors has been linked to FDI in 
terms of them providing more expertise, especially in terms of developing new markets, 
while Bhaumik et al. (2010) link ownership concentration to FDI decisions, and Driffield et 
al. (2013) to controversial or risky foreign investments.  
We then augment the model in order to test H2 by examining specifically the 
propensity of firms to invest in countries without a smoking ban. This involves replicating 
equation 4 but with the dependent variable redefined to include positive observations (coded 
1) when firms undertake FDI in a country without a smoking ban. We therefore rename the 
dependent variable “FDI in No Ban”. This means that an estimated positive coefficient for 𝛽1  
(i.e. when we include the No_Ban_Home dummy) suggests that tobacco firms from countries 
without smoking bans are more likely to do FDI in countries without smoking bans.  
4. Data 
The data consist of the population of tobacco firms, or firms who report tobacco as a 
significant activity in the ORBIS firm-level dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk. This 
provides information on 141 firms, 53 of whom engage in FDI, and 26 who invest in 
countries without a smoking ban. Thus we have an unbalanced panel of firms consisting of 
912 observations across the time period 1997–2009. Descriptive statistics and the correlation 
matrix for each variable are provided in Tables A2 and A4. All monetary values are deflated 
to remove inflation and logarithms are taken so that the estimated coefficients are elasticities. 
                                                          
10 Intangible assets  include the valuations of brands, trademarks, amortised R&D and  patents 
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In order to create a variable that captures the concentration of ownership we download each 
shareholder’s percentage of ownership and then construct a Herfindahl index using the sum 
of squared ownership shares.11.  
We identify FDI if firm has at least a 10 percent ownership stake in an overseas 
subsidiary, involved in the production or distribution of tobacco. This we see as a proxy for 
market seeking FDI, the desire to “get nearer to the customer”. Therefore, for the first 
specification, the dependent variable (FDI) is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a subsidiary 
abroad and 0 otherwise. For the second specification, the dependent variable (FDI in No Ban) 
is again a dummy and equals 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary in a country without a 
smoking ban and 0 otherwise. Finally, the variable used to test hypotheses H1 and H2 
(No_Ban_Home) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s country of origin is in a 
location without a smoking ban and 0 otherwise. 
4.1. Data on smoking bans & tobacco taxes 
The data on smoking bans are obtained from chartsbin.com, which constructs an index 
from the World Health Organizations WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic (2008) 
and from the American Cancer Society and World Lung Foundation’s Tobacco Atlas 
(2009).12 Chartsbin.com classifies countries according to six categories, as defined in Table 1. 
Table 1 here 
In order to construct the dummy variables outlined above we combine definitions 1–5 
and classify those firms as coming from countries with smoking ban legislation, whereas 
firms from countries that fulfil the sixth definition are those from “no ban” countries. 
Additionally, we use exactly the same approach in order to determine whether a firm’s 
subsidiaries are located in countries without smoking bans. Table A1 in Appendix A 
identifies 93 countries in the world that, according to chartsbin.com in 2009, had no smoking 
bans.13 For convenience we include the 2009 Human Development Index ranking for each 
country and it is clear that the majority of countries have low or medium human 
development. 
                                                          
11 The Herfindahl of ownership concentration is the sum of each shareholder’s ownership percentage squared. 
We normalise this measure so that it lies between 0 and 1 with 1 representing a firm with a sole owner.  
12 The ChartsBin collector team also use the following source for the Kazakh data: AFP, 2009. 
13 We acknowledge that during and after 2009, tobacco controls were being introduced in a number of countries 
that are classified as countries without a smoking ban, e.g. Denmark. 
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Additional details about the data can be seen in Table 2 which describes parent firm 
coverage. As can be seen, the 141 parent firms span 20 countries. Out of these 20 countries 6 
of them had an absence of smoking bans in 2009: (1) China; (2) Croatia; (3) Czech Republic; 
(4) Greece; (5) Japan; and (6) Poland. In total, 24 firms come from China; 19 are from 
Bulgaria; and 17 are from Germany, whereas 7 come from the United States and 2 come from 
the United Kingdom. Interestingly, none of the parent firms are located in a country that is 
classified by the United Nations as having low human development. The data also include the 
world’s largest international tobacco firms: China National Tobacco; Philip Morris 
International Inc.; Japan Tobacco International; British American Tobacco; and Imperial 
Tobacco Group. Unsurprisingly, all of these firms have subsidiaries in “no ban” countries. 
Table 2 here 
The data on Excise duties14 is obtained from the World Health Organisation and is 
equal to the tax on the most sold brand of cigarettes as a percentage of prices in 2008. Table 2 
reports the data for the home countries included in our analysis. As can be seen there is some 
evidence to suggest that low tax rates are associated with limited ban legislation but this is 
not always the case. Both Poland and the Czech Republic had minimal ban legislation in 
2009 but very high excise tax rates. 
5. Results 
The results for the baseline are presented in Table 3. Here the dependent variable is the 
FDI variable discussed above. This model works well, with a high proportion of correct 
predictions, with no bias in the number of type one or type two errors. This overall confirms 
our approach based on Rugman’s FSA/CSA matrix.  
Table 3 here 
We find clear support for H1, in that interventions designed to reduce smoking also 
reduce the likelihood of FDI. Firms from countries without a smoking ban are 7.6% more 
likely to carry out FDI. This suggests that the lack of a smoking ban at home is more likely to 
drive FDI, such that in this sector the lack of a smoking ban can be seen as a country-specific 
asset. In addition, the coefficient for the excise duty is negative again indicating that 
                                                          
14 See http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.TOB_32800 
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intervention mitigates internationalisation, though the effect is much weaker. Even a doubling 
of excise duty would only lead to a reduction in the propensity to internationalise of 0.2%. 
There is clear support for H3 in line with the large literature that seeks to model FDI 
flows with reference to either the knowledge capital model, or the resource based view of the 
firm. Managerial capacity is positively associated with FDI, as are sales, and in most cases 
cash flow. The other firm level variables including sales and age are also linked with greater 
FDI intensity.  In all cases, while the coefficients on sales and sales-squared point to a 
nonlinear relationship between size and internationalisation, the turning points are around the 
15th percentile in the distribution, such that for most firms the probability of 
internationalisation increases with firm size.  Interestingly, the lower the value of free cash, 
after controlling for size, the greater the propensity for firms to engage in FDI. This is 
strongly suggestive of market seeking FDI, as firms seek to bolster falling net revenue by 
seeking new markets. 
Typically, the literature that focusses on what may be termed controversial investments 
finds a positive effect of ownership concentration. Here however, such investment represents 
the core business for the firm as opposed to more peripheral decisions of whether to choose 
between two locations, or whether to diversify into potentially profitable but perhaps socially 
unpopular activities. Interestingly therefore, Dispersed ownership does not influence what in 
other circumstances may be considered a controversial investment or attract adverse 
comment in the press.15 
Turning now to hypothesis 2, this requires a more finely grained analysis, concerning 
FDI in “no ban” countries. The most striking result in Table 4 is the confirmation of H2 that 
firms from countries without a smoking ban are more likely to invest in other non-ban 
countries. The marginal effect of 0.536 suggests that the magnitude of this is over 50%. This 
provides clear evidence that “institutions matter”; where a ban does not exist in the home 
country, firms are more likely to engage in FDI to other countries without a smoking ban. 
Despite pressure from falling receipts in countries with smoking bans it is not tobacco firms 
from ban countries that are taking the lead in FDI in non-ban countries to meet their 
economic responsibilities (Carroll, 1979; 1991). This suggests that viewing FDI in the 
                                                          
15 In practice, such moderating effects occur through pressure groups or activists purchasing shares in such 
companies in order to pressure managers into certain decisions. We know of no examples of, for example, 
cancer or health charities investing in tobacco firms. 
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tobacco industry through the lens of institution theory is correct. The prevailing national 
norms and values vis-à-vis tobacco within the host country, proxied here via smoking bans, 
do appear to constrain the FDI activity of tobacco firms and thus act as a source of country-
specific disadvantage. Thus national policy appears to have made firms situated in countries 
with smoking bans better corporate citizens (Carroll, 1998). Over time, therefore, firms from 
countries without a smoking ban will become more important, especially in the developing 
world, as countries from the developing world are less likely to introduce smoking bans.  
Interestingly, the effect of increasing excise duty has a similar, but smaller effect, in 
that counties with higher excise duty (and therefore greater discouragement for smoking), 
have lower incidence of outward FDI in this sector. Taken together, in conjunction with the 
effect of sales, the results suggest that in countries where the demand for tobacco is falling, 
then a smoking ban hastens this process, and reduces still further the capacity of firms from 
that country to carry out FDI. Alternatively, where a firm’s demand is increasing, then a ban 
dampens the extent to which this growth leads to internationalisation.  
Table 4 here  
Robustness Checks  
As a robustness check, we also estimated the model using not sales but the change in 
sales, to allow for a reduction in sales in this setting to drive internationalisation. The results 
are suggestive of this, and all other findings are robust to this specification, reported in 
appendix A3. 
 
In addition, we were concerned that one could argue that smoking bans are potentially 
endogenously derived within a model of internationalisation. For example, one may argue 
that a large firm, potentially employing a large number of people in a less well-off region, 
may threaten to go offshore if a ban comes in, and therefore be able to prevent a ban from 
being introduced. We therefore test this using a standard test for endogeneity and report the 
result in table 316. 
 
                                                          
16 The Smith-Blundell test is a likelihood ratio test for endogeneity. As with all such tests, the key problem is to 
find an instrument, in our case something that is correlated with the potential smoking ban but not correlated 
with internationalisation. We used various institutional measures, such as corruption, law and order and 
employment at home (on the basis that the more employment a firm has had home the more lobby power it may 
have). In all cases we do not reject the null hypothesis of the ban variable being exogenous. The result reported 
relates to the use of law and order as an instrument, which generated the lowest p value. 
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6. Conclusion 
The world health organisation estimates that over 6 million people every year die 
from smoking related illnesses. These figures are falling in the developed world, but continue 
to rise in developing countries.  Our results highlight the role that smoking bans in developed 
countries can play in seeking to reduce these figures. Equally, in 2015 when the UK 
government announced the intention to move to plain packaging for tobacco, independent 
estimates placed the value of the intellectual property associated with the main UK brands at 
£20 billion17. This emphasises, albeit in an atypical industry, the impact that taxation, 
interventions and institutional quality can have on firm performance and internationalisation. 
Taken together, our results highlight both some specific policy aspects of the 
regulation of the global tobacco industry, as well as some more general points for the study of 
international business. Firstly, that the imposition of a smoking ban acts as an institutional 
constraint on a tobacco firm’s internationalisation strategy thus acting as a source of country-
specific disadvantage. Several international bodies such as the World Health Organization, 
UNCTAD and UNIDO are concerned with the proliferation of the tobacco industry 
internationally, and our results highlight the role that domestic policy can have in reducing 
this. Hitherto it has been suggested that first world smoking bans are essentially unilateral 
actions that will lead to internationalisation of firms, but our results show that this is not the 
case. Rather, our analysis links host and home country institutions, firm level governance and 
ownership structures, and CSR through the matrix of FSA/CSA to firm level FDI decisions.  
Focussing on the tobacco industry, we have shown that the domestic regulatory stance 
taken by governments to dissuade people from smoking (and thus cut health-care costs) does 
impact on firm level behaviour. Smoking ban legislation is an institutional factor impacting 
and shaping consumption within the tobacco industry, and impacting directly on 
internationalisation. Further, it is clear that firms without a smoking ban at home are growing 
more important, and are expanding into developing countries or those countries with low 
human development.  
We subsequently are able to show that firms who invest in non-ban countries are also 
more likely to invest in developing countries. This suggests that institutions seeking to 
                                                          
17 The Independent, May 22nd 2015, available at : http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-
families/health-news/tobacco-companies-file-lawsuits-against-uk-government-over-plain-packaging-laws-
10270874.html 
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influence national CSR (proxied by smoking bans) significantly influence FDI decisions and 
location decisions. Our findings indicate the need for further research linking FDI, not merely 
in controversial sectors, but in controversial circumstances, to both local and global debates 
concerning governance and regulation.  
6.1 Limitations  
The first question that we must address is the extent to which one can generalise from 
analysis based on what might be considered an atypical industry. For example, western 
models of governance rely on dispersed ownership, and the roles of non-executive directors 
to mitigate extreme behaviour. Such a model does not apply here. Directors emphasise 
economic over moral or ethical responsibilities (Carroll, 1979, 1991) and ownership 
concentration is seemingly irrelevant.  
In terms of internationalisation, while, as we explain above, it is reasonable to assume 
that FDI in this sector is for market seeking reasons rather than resource seeking or efficiency 
seeking. We have however inferred that from the nature of the sector, and the apparent 
activities based on industry classification codes of affiliates, rather than observing this 
directly. Thirdly, export information at the firm level is patchy. There is no obligation within 
many countries financial reporting rules to report exports, and none do so by location18. As 
such, we examine only one part of the internationalisation decision. Finally, there is a trade-
off here between data quality, and coverage. For the large western firms, we can in general 
extract financial information on the foreign affiliates, capturing investment levels, sales 
volumes etc. However, this information is not available for smaller firms, and the coverage is 
poor in many developing countries. As such, we have taken the decision to capture as wide a 
data set as possible, but the measure of FDI as a binary variable we acknowledge is 
restrictive.  
6.2 Implications 
Our results support the moves worldwide to implement further anti-smoking 
legislation. India has moved to ban FDI in this sector, and many countries that we list as “no 
ban” countries are subsequently enacted anti-smoking legislation (ANR, 2014). China will 
                                                          
18 In the UK for example larger companies report “earnings from overseas” but this may include profits on 
currency transactions undertaken abroad, or sales of overseas assets for example. 
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end smoking in indoor spaces by the end of 2014 (CNN, 2014) and Japan now has 
restrictions on smoking in some prefectures (regions) (ANR, 2014). In addition, further work 
is required around firm strategy in this domain. Our model has assumed that FDI in this 
sector is market seeking. Of course this may not be the case, and recent decisions taken in 
India to ban FDI must be seen in this light. For example, there are a growing number of 
tobacco companies among emerging market MNEs who may respond differently to such 
regulation. We know that in general emerging market MNEs rely much more on CSAs than 
FSAs to facilitate internationalisation, and as regulation of tobacco in emerging markets still 
lags behind the developed world, we may see further growth in internationalisation from 
these countries. Equally, it is well known that emerging market MNEs have different 
ownership and governance structures from traditional MNEs, and as a result respond 
differently to institutions and institutional voids, so we may observe different firm level 
responses to such bans in the future. In the Indian context, the view of national policy makers 
was that India would be seen as an attractive location for both efficiency seeking FDI and 
market seeking FDI, leading to lower prices domestically and greater health risks in the 
future. Our results confirm the wisdom of the decision to ban FDI in this sector in India.  
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Table 1: Defining smoking bans. 
Ban type Definition 
Complete ban Smoke-free legislation covering all types of places 
and institutions. 
Strong ban Smoke-free legislation covering health-care and 
educational facilities, but with limited exceptions. 
Moderate ban Smoke-free legislation covering health-care and 
educational facilities, as well as 3, 4, or 5 other places 
and institutions. 
Minimal ban Smoke-free legislation covering health-care and 
educational facilities, as well as 1 or 2 other places 
and institutions. 
Comprehensive local legislation Smoke-free legislation at a sub-national level. 
No ban Complete absence of smoke-free legislation, or 
absence of smoke-free legislation covering either 
health-care or educational facilities. 
Table 2: Parent firm location and country’s smoking ban status. 
Parent country 
of origin 
Number of 
firms 
Percentage of 
sample 
Country’s ban 
status in 2009† 
Most sold brand 
of cigarettes – 
taxes as a % of 
price (2008) †† 
Belgium 6 4.26 Moderate ban 77.43 
Bulgaria 19 13.48 Minimal ban 85.44 
China 24 17.02 No ban 36.18 
Croatia 3 2.13 No ban 60.70 
Czech Republic 3 2.13 No ban 82.83 
France 2 1.42 Strong ban 80.39 
Germany 17 12.06 Local legislation 75.78 
Greece 11 7.8 No ban 73.47 
India 2 1.42 Local legislation 46.20 
Italy 11 7.8 Strong ban 75.17 
Japan 1 0.71 No ban 63.06 
Jordan 1 0.71 Minimal ban 77.20 
Netherlands 6 4.26 Strong ban 73.67 
Poland 9 6.38 No ban 93.84 
Portugal 2 1.42 Moderate ban 79.60 
Romania 1 0.71 Moderate ban 72.37 
Spain 11 7.8 Moderate ban 77.35 
Sweden 3 2.13 Strong ban 71.85 
United Kingdom 2 1.42 Complete ban 76.57 
United States 7 4.96 Local legislation 36.57 
Total 141 100   
†Source: ChartsBin Statistics Collector Team (2009). 
†† Source: World Health Organisation  
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Table 3: The FDI decision (marginal effects). 
VARIABLES FDI FDI 
ln Sales -0.291*** -0.286*** 
  (0.0606) (0.0598) 
ln Sales² 0.0206*** 0.0201*** 
  (0.00339) (0.00336) 
ln Cash flow 0.00141 0.00207 
  (0.00541) (0.00552) 
Intangible/Total Assets -0.0629 -0.241 
  (0.379) (0.382) 
Age 0.00348*** 0.00407*** 
  (0.00115) (0.00120) 
Age² -2.30e-05*** -2.65e-05*** 
  (6.08e-06) (6.37e-06) 
Number of Directors 0.0195*** 0.0204*** 
  (0.00398) (0.00399) 
Herfindahl -0.0303 -0.00461 
  (0.0567) (0.0584) 
No_Ban_Home 0.0759*  
 (0.0400)  
Tobacco Tax  -0.00261* 
  (0.00134) 
Observations 912 912 
LR (9) 313.818 314.001 
Prob> LR 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R² 0.2505 0.2506 
Correct predictions 76.75 76.86 
Smith-Blundell (χ²) 0.0298 0.1382 
P-value 0.8629 0.7100 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, * p<0.119 
The Smith-Blundell statistic reports the appropriate test for endogeneity20.  
 
 
                                                          
19 Robustness testing: Within this setting we included a number of variables including debt, interest rate 
coverage, total assets and total employment (both alongside and instead of sales) and measures of productivity. 
The coefficients reported here are robust to their inclusion, but likelihood ratio tests do not reject their exclusion, 
jointly or separately, neither do their t values.  
20 We ran various tests for endogeneity using all available instruments for board size, and cannot reject the 
hypothesis that board size is exogenous. The final possibility is that the imposition of a ban itself is endogenous. 
For example one could imagine that dominant firms, large employers, those who generate revenue for the 
exchequer, or exports, may be able to influence policy through lobbying. The tests employed were unable to 
reject the hypothesis that these variables were exogenous.  
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Table 4: The decision to invest in locations without smoking bans (marginal effects). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES FDI in no ban FDI in no ban 
ln Sales -0.267*** -0.201*** 
  (0.0461) (0.0453) 
ln Sales² 0.0185*** 0.0148*** 
  (0.00279) (0.00256) 
ln Cash flow -0.00859** -0.0155*** 
  (0.00396) (0.00441) 
Intangible/Total Assets 0.330 -0.0294 
  (0.258) (0.262) 
Age 0.00262*** 0.00241** 
  (0.000788) (0.000968) 
Age² -2.21e-05*** -2.89e-05*** 
  (3.82e-06) (6.58e-06) 
Number of Directors 0.00535** 0.00890*** 
  (0.00222) (0.00296) 
Herfindahl 0.0195 -0.0160 
  (0.0321) (0.0366) 
No_Ban_Home 0.536***  
 (0.0434)  
Tobacco Tax  -0.00274** 
  (0.00107) 
Observations 912 912 
LR (9) 491.937 312.297 
Prob> LR 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R² 0.5100 0.3238 
Correct predictions 87.39% 83.22% 
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Table A1: No ban countries in 2009 by HDI ranking. 
Low HDI Medium HDI High HDI Very high HDI Not classified 
Afghanistan Cape Verde Albania Barbados Ant. & Barb. 
Angola China Armenia Brunei Cuba 
Bangladesh Congo, Rep. Azerbaijan Czech Rep. Dominica 
Burma Dom. Rep. Bahamas Denmark Grenada 
Burundi El Salvador Belarus Greece Kiribati 
Comoros Fiji Belize Hungary Lebanon 
Congo, DR Gabon Chile Japan Marsh. Islands 
Côte d’Ivoire Guyana Costa Rica Korea, South Nauru 
Ethiopia Honduras Croatia Luxembourg Palau 
Ghana Kyrgyzstan Georgia Monaco St Kitts & Nev. 
Guinea-Biss. Micronesia Jamaica Poland St Vincent 
Haiti Mongolia Latvia Qatar Samoa 
Iraq Namibia Macedonia   San Marino 
Liberia Nicaragua Russia   Somalia 
Malawi Paraguay Tonga   Tuvalu 
Mauritania Sao Tome  Tunisia   Vanuatu 
Nepal Sol. Islands Ukraine     
Papua NG Suriname       
Rwanda Syria       
Senegal Tajikistan       
Sierra Leone Timor-Leste       
Sudan Uzbekistan       
Tanzania Vietnam       
Togo         
Source: United Nations (2009). Human Development Report. New York 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics (overall data). 
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. 
FDI 912 0.444 0.497 
FDI in No Ban 912 0.221 0.415 
ln Sales 912 9.817 2.687 
ln Sales² 912 103.574 58.675 
Change in Sales 774 0.040 0.706 
ln Cash flow 912 4.614 4.590 
Intangible/Total  Assets 912 0.034 0.094 
Age 912 32.093 34.368 
Age² 912 2209.821 5633.157 
Number of Directors 912 6.803 6.101 
Herfindahl 912 0.661 0.380 
No_Ban_Home 912 0.334 0.472 
Tobacco Tax 912 71.072 16.977 
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Table A3: FDI in No Ban Countries with the Change in Sales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
VARIABLES FDI in no ban FDI in no ban 
Percentage Change in Sales 0.0374** 0.0368* 
 (0.0181) (0.0196) 
ln Cash flow 0.0136*** 0.00791** 
  (0.00420) (0.00403) 
Intangible/Total Assets 1.338*** 1.019*** 
  (0.234) (0.193) 
Age 0.00164 0.00234** 
  (0.00103) (0.00107) 
Age² -1.29e-05** -2.06e-05*** 
  (5.39e-06) (6.06e-06) 
Number of Directors 0.00919*** 0.0125*** 
  (0.00238) (0.00273) 
Herfindahl 0.0434 0.0616 
  (0.0389) (0.0384) 
No_Ban_Home 0.428***  
 (0.0388)  
Tobacco Tax  -0.00569*** 
  (0.00111) 
Observations 774 774 
LR (8) 274.788 165.988 
Prob> LR 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R² 0.3311 0.2000 
Correct predictions 85.66 82.82% 
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Table A4: Correlation coefficients. 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 FDI 1.000                         
2 FDI in No Ban 0.597 1.000                       
3 ln Sales 0.461 0.494 1.000                     
4 ln Sales² 0.466 0.531 0.977 1.000                   
5 Percentage Change in Sales 0.0221 0.0606 0.1406 0.1063 1.000                 
6 ln Cash flow 0.304 0.238 0.601 0.620 0.0319 1.000               
7 Intangible/Total  Assets 0.240 0.386 0.532 0.630 0.0257 0.390 1.000             
8 Age 0.143 -0.013 0.181 0.146 -0.1223 0.168 -0.058 1.000           
9 Age² 0.090 -0.037 0.135 0.122 -0.0798 0.149 -0.056 0.877 1.000         
10 Number of Directors 0.401 0.314 0.529 0.537 -0.0794 0.447 0.380 0.239 0.158 1.000       
11 Herfindahl -0.060 -0.137 -0.107 -0.169 0.0816 -0.167 -0.334 0.116 0.051 -0.139 1.000     
12 No_Ban_Home 0.017 0.344 -0.003 -0.018 0.047 -0.207 -0.050 -0.082 -0.022 -0.069 -0.015 1.000   
13 Tobacco Tax -0.110 -0.220 -0.215 -0.235 -0.0525 0.089 -0.199 0.109 -0.053 -0.029 0.271 -0.340 1.000 
 
